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Analysis of International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data collected in 18 Western countries in 1998 demon-
strates that Christian desires for a public role of religion are strongest in countries where Christian religiosity
is numerically most marginal. Moreover, Dutch data covering the period 1970–1996 confirm that the decline of
the number of Christians in the Netherlands has been coincided by a strengthening of the call for public religion
among the remaining faithful and by increased polarization about this with the nonreligious. Religious decline
and religious privatization, two of the most crucial dimensions of secularization (Casanova 1994), hence develop
dialectically: as the number of Christians declines, the remaining faithful seem increasingly unwilling to accept
the “secularist truce”—the secularist contract that guarantees religious freedom yet bans religion from the public
sphere by relegating it to the private realm.
During the last two decades secularization theory has lost much of its former aura. Once
virtually uncontested and generally regarded empirically sound, a flow of critique has surged
since the 1980s. Even its most important adherents of the past, such as Peter Berger (1967),
have turned their positions: “The assumption that we live in a secularized world is false. The
world today . . . is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever.
This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists . . . is essentially
mistaken” (Berger 1999:2). Others argue that the theory of secularization has been exposed as
ideology in disguise. Instead of a sound scientific theory, they regard it a mere dream that is
intimately tied to the rationalist discourse of modernity (Hadden 1987:588; see also Stark and
Bainbridge 1985; Stark and Finke 2000).
Many consider the secularization thesis as too broad and unspecific. Hadden, for in-
stance, qualifies it as a “hotchpotch of loosely employed ideas rather than a systematic the-
ory” (1987:587)—an observation that is neither new, nor confined to the theory’s critics. About
40 years ago Shiner (1967) already pointed out that the concept of secularization contains at
least six distinct dimensions, and a quarter of a century ago Dobbelaere (1981) emphasized that
secularization takes radically different shapes at the micro-, meso- and macrolevels (see also
Tschannen 1991). Steve Bruce (2002:39), one of the theory’s principal proponents today, could
not agree more and declares that “there is no secularization theory.” A virtual consensus thus exists
that “secularization theory” is a multiheaded dragon, an essentially incoherent bundle of loosely
related subtheses with at best a Wittgensteinian “family resemblance.” This lack of theoretical
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clarity spawns a confusing and hardly productive debate in which religious fundamentalism,
for instance, can either be construed as contradicting secularization theory (e.g., Juergensmeyer
1993) or as confirming it, because “modern manifestations of fundamentalism . . . presuppose that
some kind of secularization is in progress—no fundamentalism without (prior) secularization”
(Lechner 1991:1114).
In spite of this fuzziness, secularization theory has an uncontested core. Both adherents
like Wilson (1976, 1982) and critics like Luckmann (1967, 2003) accept “the thesis of the
differentiation of the religious and secular spheres” as “the still defensible core of the theory of
secularization” (Casanova 1994:19). Virtually all sociologists of religion hence agree that religion
was once a sort of “sacred canopy” that covered all domains of society (Berger 1967)—medieval
art was still basically religious art, science and religion could not yet clearly be distinguished
during the Renaissance, and today’s separation of state and church in Western countries only
came into existence after a long and painful historical struggle (e.g., Bell 1976; Wilson 1982).
Two subtheses in particular dominate the contemporary debate: “the decline-of-religion
thesis” and the “privatization thesis” (Casanova 1994:19–20). The debate about the decline-of-
religion thesis is about whether, where, and why we are witnessing a decline of institutionalized,
mainline church religion on the one hand (e.g., Houtman and Mascini 2002; Norris and Inglehart
2004) and religious innovation, revitalization, and cult formation, typically occurring outside the
mainline churches, on the other (e.g., Heelas et al. 2005; Houtman and Aupers 2007; Houtman
and Mascini 2002; Luckmann 1967; Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Yinger 1957).
The debate about the privatization thesis is about whether, where, and why we are witnessing
either a confinement of religion to the domain of private life or an increasing tendency to
push religion as a moral resource for the public domain. Luckmann’s (1967) classical argument
is that religion becomes increasingly privatized and hence socially and publicly insignificant
and “invisible.” Yet, various observers have rightly pointed out that religion has become more
publicly significant in various countries since the 1980s (e.g., Casanova 1994; Conway 1996;
Haynes 1998; Juergensmeyer 1993). Meanwhile, the privatization thesis has even been critiqued
for misconstruing contemporary spirituality as radically privatized (Aupers and Houtman 2006;
Besecke 2005; Grant, O’Neil, and Stephens 2004).
Creatively linking the study of individual religiosity to the study of the (de)privatization of
religion, Chaves (1994:751) has critiqued the one-sided focus on the institutional level of society
as a whole in studies of deprivatization—a focus informed by secularization theory’s uncontested
tenet that even apart from what may have happened to individual religiosity, “it is the system that
has become secularized” (Wilson 1985:19).
More specifically, proceeding in a classical Weberian mode of reasoning, Chaves argues that
this focus wrongly neglects the theoretically vital question of whether and how religion drives
individual believers’ social actions beyond the strictly private domain. He hence argues for the
need to study secularization as the decline of religion’s social significance for individual believers
(“declining religious authority”). We follow Chaves’s plea in this article by studying whether or
not the decline of Christian religiosity in contemporary Western countries has been accompanied
by a waning or rather a waxing of desires among Christians for an active role of religion in public
life. If religious decline fuels rather than diminishes desires for a public role of religion among
Christians, this would mean—in Casanova’s terms used above—that religious decline produces
desires for deprivatization. Such a finding would surely provide striking support for the case of
abandoning all-too-general notions of secularization, made by authors such as Martin (1965),
Shiner (1967), and Hadden (1987).
Dialectics of Secularization?
Somewhat surprising against the background of the almost universal acknowledgment that
secularization is a multidimensional phenomenon, the possibility that its dimensions may develop
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in different directions has received only scant attention in the literature. The typical (albeit usually
tacit) assumption is that declining levels of Christian religiosity tend to coincide with a decline
in its social significance for the faithful (e.g., Halman, Petterson, and Verweij 1999). In his
aforementioned plea for conceiving of secularization as a decline in religion’s social significance
for individual believers, Chaves (1994) does not seriously consider the alternative possibility of
an increase in social significance either (see also Lechner 1991). In his historical critique of the
debate on secularization, Gorski (2000:162) on the other hand stresses the importance of having
an eye for the possibility that different dimensions of secularization may not necessarily develop
in a similar fashion.
Acknowledging secularization’s multidimensionality, Bruce (2002:39) also takes care to
point out that “the secularization paradigm is not the sociological equivalent of synchronized
swimming. It does not require or expect that all indices of religious vitality will decline at the
same speed or evenly.” As a consequence, he argues, secularization theory—or, more correct and
preferred by Bruce, “the secularization paradigm”—is not threatened by minor or exceptional
counterindications:
We should never forget that [general social changes] are abstractions created by colour-washing the jagged edges
of events in the real world. . . . The jagged bits are a problem only if it can be plausibly argued that a different
abstraction can be better drawn from the same material. If there are too many exceptions, then we should consider
painting “growth” or even just “random fluctuations”. But some small reversals need not trouble the paradigm.
(2002:40)
This position can of course easily be translated into a testable proposition: if an all-out process of
secularization is taking place, then we will surely find a number of outliers and exceptions, but
the general pattern will be a decline of individual religiosity coinciding with a declining role of
religion in driving preferences about the role of religion in public life.
Yet, a recent study conducted in the Netherlands—a country in which personal religiosity
has dropped to much lower levels than in virtually all other countries in the world (Norris and
Inglehart 2004)—suggests that social significance at the level of individual believers may have
increased rather than decreased. Dekker (2007) finds evidence that the number of Christians
who say that their belief is “significant” or “very significant” for them has increased by almost
30 percent (from 33 percent in 1979 to 42 percent in 2006):
The development already visible 10 years ago has continued during the last decade: faith plays a role in the lives of
fewer and fewer people, yet becomes increasingly significant for those who do believe. Especially the number of
believers who say that their faith is very significant in their lives has increased relatively very strongly. (2007:56;
our translation from Dutch, emphasis in original)
This is a remarkable finding that goes way beyond the possibility that the various dimensions
of secularization proceed at different paces, yet eventually all change in the same direction. The
key question, as Bruce rightly emphasizes, is whether this finding is merely a “jagged bit” or
exemplifies a more general pattern. If the latter is the case in the Netherlands and other Western
countries, this would mean nothing less than that secularization in one respect—declining numbers
of religious individuals—would be accompanied by desecularization in another—increasing
aspirations for religion in the public domain among the remaining Christians. Three scenarios
predict such a development.
First, it is of course conceivable that the spread of secularism affects less religious believers
first and disproportionally, stimulating them to abandon their religious creeds, so that increasingly
a hard core of passionate believers remains. If such a process occurs, religious decline produces
a sort of “purification” of the religious population with the remaining believers increasingly
affirming the necessity of a public role for religion.
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Second, as Western societies grow more heterogeneous, churches may feel increasingly
forced to mobilize their congregations. As Luckmann (1967) already pointed out, structural
differentiation after all erodes the monopoly of Christianity, yielding a market for ultimate
significance in which various religious traditions “battle” for believers. The emergence of such a
religious marketplace may go hand in hand with religious innovation (cf. Stark and Bainbridge
1985), may increase church attendance (Phillips 2004), and may cause the religious to fiercely
reassert the public importance of their creed. Religious decline may hence also go together with
heightened desires for a public role of religion because it is accompanied by increased religious
heterogeneity.
Third, although Bruce aims to defend secularization theory against current charges and
maintains that “religion diminishes in social significance, becomes increasingly privatized, and
loses personal salience” (2002:30), he nonetheless points out that religion may be made more
salient by the process of secularization itself. To be more precise, Christian identities may not
only be reaffirmed through increases in religious heterogeneity, but also through the spread of
secularism: “culture, identity and sense of worth are challenged by a source promoting either an
alien religion or rampant secularism and that source is negatively valued” (2002:31).
Hypotheses
The three scenarios outlined above are clearly not identical. The first (purification of Christian
religion), can occur in the absence of other religious traditions, while this is impossible in case of
the second (increased competition by other religions). In the third scenario, increasing secularism
may have similar consequences as the presence of competing religions. Just like in the first
scenario, the presence of the latter is hence not assumed in the third one either. We will briefly
return to these three scenarios in our conclusion.
We focus our analysis on what the three scenarios have in common and hence study the
tenability of their shared assumption that religious decline goes together with increasing desires
for deprivatization of religion among the remaining Christians. We study, in other words, whether
Christian religiosity is most forcefully associated with desires for a public role of religion in pre-
cisely those contexts in which Christian believers are least numerous. We do so by comparing 18
contemporary Western countries, in some of which Christian religiosity is much more widespread
than in others, and by studying changes across time in the Netherlands.
Besides obvious reasons of data availability (we need comparative data that cover a substantial
period), there are two more substantial reasons to follow the process across time in the Netherlands
only. This is, after all, not only the country in which religion has declined much more than
anywhere else, but also the country for which at least some evidence for the assumed dialectics of
secularization exists (Dekker 2007). Needless to say, the cross-national analysis of other Western
countries is intended as a first rough test of whether the Netherlands constitutes an anomaly or
may rather exemplify a more general pattern.
We test four hypotheses, the first two pertaining to differences between the 18 Western
countries in 1998 and the last two to changes in the Netherlands during the period 1970–1996.
As to the differences between countries, the three scenarios outlined above suggest that Chris-
tian aspirations for a public role of religion are strongest in countries where the number of
Christians is lowest (hypothesis 1). Moreover, the gap in opinions between Christians and the
nonreligious is expected to be wider in countries with fewer adherents of Christianity (hy-
pothesis 2). As to changes in the Netherlands, we expect that the decrease in the number of
Christians has led to increasing support for a public role of religion among them (hypothe-
sis 3). We furthermore expect that the gap in the relevant opinions between Christians and the
nonreligious has become wider as the number of Christians in the Netherlands has decreased
(hypothesis 4).
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Table 1: Factor and reliability analysis for the scale for aspirations for religion in the
public domain
Factor
Item Loading
Do you think that churches and religious organizations in this country have too
much power or too little power?
.77
Would your country be a better country if religion had less influence? .83
How much do you agree or disagree that religious leaders should not try to influence
government decisions?
.62
Religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections .66
Eigen value 2.10
R2 .53
Cronbach’s α .69
N 16,785
Source: International Social Survey Program (1998).
DATA AND MEASURES
Data
For the comparison between Western countries we use the International Social Survey
Program Religious II 1998 data set. In all countries included in the analysis, Christianity was the
dominant religion during the second half of the previous century. These countries are: Australia
(AUS), Austria (A), Canada (CND), Denmark (D), France (F), Great Britain (GB), Ireland (IRL),
Italy (I), the Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Northern Ireland (NIRL), Norway (N),
Portugal (P), Spain (E), Sweden (S), the United States (US), Switzerland (CH), and West
Germany (D-W).
The most relevant data files for the analysis on the Netherlands are the Cultural Changes
(Culturele Veranderingen) surveys ranging from 1970 to 1996. For the technical reports of the
International Social Survey Program and the Cultural Changes data sets, the reader is referred to
www.iisp.org and www.dans.knaw.nl\nl\data\, respectively.
Measures
Christian religiosity is measured simply as being a member of a Christian religious denomi-
nation or not. Respondents have been asked to indicate whether they were a member of a religious
denomination and if so, which one. Those indicating not to be a member of a religious denomi-
nation, that is, the nonreligious, are coded as 1, while respondents indicating to be a member of
one of the Christian denominations (especially Catholicism and various strains of Protestantism)1
are coded as 2. As this article aims to study the relationship between the decline of the number
of Christians and desires for a public role of Christian religion among the remaining Christians,
non-Christian religions like Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism have been coded as missing.2
1 To be more precise: respondents indicating Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Druse, Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran,
Presbyterian, Anglican, Congregationalist, Episcopal, Unitarian, Protestant (free church), Protestant (else), Orthodox,
United Church CDN, Free Presbyterian, Brethren, Pentecostal, Mormon, Salvation Army, Seventh Day Adventists,
Hussites, and other Christian religions as their denominations were coded as Christian.
2 The number of non-Christian yet religious respondents in the Dutch data is very limited; they could literally be counted
on two hands. For reasons of comparability, we have coded respondents with other than Christian denominations as
missing in the ISSP data as well.
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Aspirations for religion in the public domain is defined as support for influence of religion
on public life, thus indicating a preference for deprivatization of religion. For the international
comparison, it is measured using four Likert items that yield a reliable scale (see Table 1).
In the analysis of changes in the Netherlands, aspirations for religion in the public domain
is measured with a reliable scale based on five items. The first item measures support for the
separation of politics and religion, while the other four questions probe support for associations
based on religious principles (public broadcasting associations, sports clubs, labor organizations,
and political parties). The reliability of this scale ranges from .77 through .83 (see Table 2).
RESULTS
In order to test our hypotheses, we have conducted our analyses in three steps. First, we
study how the mean support for a public role of religion among Christians is associated with
the proportion of Christians in the population. Second, we determine whether the relationship
between individual Christian religiosity and aspirations for religion in the public domain is
stronger in contexts where Christianity has least adherents. Finally, we study whether this means
that strongest polarization between Christians and nonreligious in this exists in contexts in
which Christians are least numerous. The three steps are first performed for the cross-sectional
international comparison and then repeated to study longitudinal trends within the Netherlands.
From Figure 1 it can be concluded that a negative relationship exists between the proportion
of Christians in a country and support of these Christians for a public role of religion. As expected,
then, Christian aspirations for a public role of Christian religion are weaker in countries with
more Christians. Put differently, in massively Christian countries such as Ireland, Portugal, and
Italy, Christians attach not more, but less value to a public role of religion than in much less
Figure 1
The association between the mean aspirations for religion in the public domain of Christians
and the proportion of Christians in Western countries, 1998, N = 18 (Pearson’s r = −.72)
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Figure 2
Association between the effect of individual Christian religiosity on aspirations for religion in
the public domain and the proportion of Christians in Western countries, 1998, N = 18
(Pearson’s r = −.70)
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Christian countries such as the Netherlands and Great Britain. Given the strong and statistically
significant differences between countries, the first hypothesis can be accepted.
Figure 2 depicts the association between the proportion of Christians per country and the
degree to which aspirations for religion in the public domain are influenced by Christian religiosity,
that is, membership of a Christian denomination.3 As expected, the relationship is negative. This
means that opinion polarization between Christians and the nonreligious on the desired role of
religion in the public sphere is strongest in countries where Christians are least numerous, such
as France or the Netherlands.
In line with hypothesis 2, Figure 3 makes clear that differences in aspirations for religion
in the public domain between Christians and non-Christians are indeed smallest in countries
where the proportion of Christians is highest. In other words, the polarization between Christians
and non-Christians about beliefs on the public role of religion is strongest in countries where
Christians are least numerous. Hence, our second hypothesis is confirmed as well.
Our cross-sectional hypotheses are hence corroborated: in countries with smaller shares of
Christians, the latter distinguish themselves most decidedly when it comes to desires for a public
3 Technically speaking, Figure 2 shows a cross-level interaction, as does Figure 6. Although, strictly speaking, testing
this type of interactions should be done with multilevel analysis, we have opted for an alternative analysis because of the
small N at the country level (N = 18) and the year level (N = 6 and N = 11).
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Figure 3
The association between the difference in mean aspirations for religion in the public domain
between Christians and non-Christians and the proportion of Christians in Western countries,
1998, N = 18 (Pearson’s r = −.26)
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role of religion. This brings us to our longitudinal inquiry for the Netherlands. Because in the
Netherlands Christian religiosity has declined more than anywhere else, as Figures 1–3 have
already shown (see also Norris and Inglehart 2004), this country is a strategic case for such an
assessment. As Figure 4 demonstrates as well, Christian religiosity has decreased dramatically in
the Netherlands.
As expected, the decline in the proportion of Christians in the Netherlands has been accom-
panied by stronger Christian desires for a public role of religion (see Figure 5). Just like we have
seen in the international comparison, then, support for a public role for religion has increased
among Christians while the number of Christians itself has declined—confirming hypothesis 3.
Figure 6 indicates that the impact of individual religiosity on aspirations for religion in the
public domain varies across years with the proportion of Christians in a given year. Consistent
with our expectations, the relationship is negative: the association between individual Christian
religiosity and opinions about the public role of religion has become stronger as the number of
Christians has declined. Finally, Figure 7 demonstrates that the differences between Christians
and non-Christians were quite small when there were still many Christians in the Netherlands,
while the gap has widened as their number has declined. Our fourth and last hypothesis is hence
also accepted.
It is clear from our findings that the decline in the number of Christians in the West does not
imply that the remaining faithful have increasingly come to accept the relegation of their creed to
the private realm. The trends found for the Netherlands since 1970 and the cross-national patterns
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Figure 4
The decline of Christian religiosity in the Netherlands, 1970–1996, N = 14 (Pearson’s r = −.83)
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found for 18 Western countries rather point in the direction of a stronger assertion of the public
relevance of religion among those who have remained faithful.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Since the 1980s, the once virtually uncontested theory of secularization has been under
debate in the social sciences. The debate is mainly characterized by an exchange of arguments
pro and contra with “the effect of inducing a certain theoretical sterility and repetitiveness
within the discipline” (Chaves 1994:749). This has led to an intellectual cul-de-sac with scholars
retreating into their theoretical trenches, exchanging arguments intended to either critique or
defend secularization theory. In this article, we have demonstrated that this ongoing debate about
“whether or not” secularization takes place is indeed problematic.
While Christian religion has for many lost its former appeal in most Western countries in
recent decades, those who have remained loyal to it seem more rather than less eager than before to
assert the public relevance of their creed. In Casanova’s (1994) terms: religious decline seems to go
along with increasing desires for deprivatization, indicating secularization and desecularization,
respectively, and as such ruling out the possibility of “all-out” claims about “whether or not”
secularization takes place. Though Christians in the West have experienced substantial declines
in terms of sheer numbers, our findings hence suggest that they have become less rather than more
likely to accept the “secularist truce”—the secularist contract that guarantees religious freedom,
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Figure 5
The association between the mean aspirations for religion in the public domain of Christians
and the proportion of Christians in the Netherlands, 1970–1996, N = 11 (Pearson’s r = −.71)
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yet bans religion from the public sphere by relegating it to the private realm (see also Taylor
2007).
On a theoretical level, our findings on these dialectics of secularization and desecularization
resonate in particular with the arguments by Stark and Bainbridge (1985), Luckmann (1967),
and Bell (1977). These perspectives are, however, not unproblematic because they formulate
similar ideas about dialectics of secularization in vague, neo-Freudian terms such as the “return
of the repressed” (Giddens 1991:207) without being specific about exactly how, why, and under
which cultural circumstances religion fights its way back into late-modern society or aims to
strengthen its position. Stark and Bainbridge, for instance, simply consider secularization a
“self-limiting process” and since they assume that “the amount of religion remains relatively
constant,” religious decline will—in their view—always be accompanied by religious innovation
and experimentation (Stark and Bainbridge 1985:2–3). In a similar vein, Bell has argued “that
very destruction [of ‘aura’]—and the realization of that fact—is itself a starting point of a new
response” (1977:444). Underneath these all-too-sweeping accounts, the nonsociological and even
metaphysical assumption of religion as a basic anthropological condition and a universal need
of man is looming large. Man is taken to be a homo religiosus (Luckmann 1967) and it is hence
assumed that religion will prevail simply because people in all eras and cultures will always have
to struggle with death, illness, and problems of meaning. Indicative of such a metaphysical line
of reasoning is the following quote from Daniel Bell:
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Figure 6
Association between the effect of individual Christian religiosity on aspirations for religion in
the public domain and the proportion of Christians in the Netherlands, 1970–1996, N = 11
(Pearson’s r = −.38)
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Will there be a return of the sacred, the rise of new religious modes? Of that I have no doubt. . . . The ground of
religion is existential: the awareness of men of their finiteness and the inexorable limits to their powers, and the
consequent effort to find a coherent answer to reconcile them to that human condition. (1977:444, 447)
We distance ourselves from these speculations on the status of religion as a constant anthropolog-
ical condition since assumptions like these can, by their very nature, not be verified nor falsified in
an empirical sense. Nevertheless, our findings do resonate with the general approach of secular-
ization as a “self-limiting process.” In this respect, it is important that Bruce (2002:33) suggests
that a temporary revival of religiosity does not necessarily entail a process of desecularization.
Under particular conditions, he argues, religion may temporarily flower, simply indicating that
secularization does not proceed in a straight, linear fashion. Our findings, however, demonstrate
a solid, long-standing trend instead of just a “jagged bit”: the increased assertion of religion’s
public role is systematically related to its numerical decline.
Our findings provide a basis for future research in three ways. First, our findings could inspire
research addressing the question why these remarkable dialectical trends are occurring. Above,
we have distinguished three mechanisms that might explain why the different dimensions of
secularization develop in opposite directions. Which of these mechanisms underlies the dialectics
of secularization is still an open question, as our article merely provides a description of this
process. Future research aimed at fleshing out the roles of these mechanisms is hence called for.
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Figure 7
The association between the difference in mean aspirations for religion in the public domain
between Christians and non-Christians and the proportion of Christians in the Netherlands,
1970–1996, N = 11 (Pearson’s r = −.28)
Proportion of Christians
0.600.550.500.450.400.35
D
if
fe
re
nc
e 
in
 m
ea
n 
as
pi
ra
ti
on
s 
fo
r 
re
li
gi
on
 in
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 
do
m
ai
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
C
hr
is
ti
an
s 
an
d 
no
n-
C
hr
is
ti
an
s 
0.625
0.60
0.575
0.55
0.525
0.50
Second, our research has focused only on the public importance people attach to religion,
and not so much on the role of religion in various other domains of life. For instance, we already
know from other studies that individual religiosity matters more for moral and political values
in contexts where the number of Christians is lowest (Houtman 2003; Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis,
and DerSlik 2002). Yet, as Chaves (1994) rightly observes, religion’s increased salience does not
only reveal itself in its greater sway over personal values but over personal behavior, too. The
circumstance that individual religiosity more strongly affects membership of and activity within
voluntary associations in more secular contexts points in the latter direction (Ruiter 2008), but
future research should also explore this issue by looking, for instance, at voting behavior, mating
behavior, and school choice.
Third, the increased polarization between Christians and non-Christians found in this ar-
ticle sheds a new light onto the so-called Culture Wars debate. In this debate, fueled by the
works of Hunter (1991, 1994), social scientists argue about the question whether or not there
is increased polarization about religiously inspired moral and cultural issues such as abortion,
homosexuality, and the like. This debate has given rise to empirical studies investigating the
degree to which there is a growing disagreement between individuals over these types of is-
sues. However, Hunter’s polarization thesis has hardly been corroborated empirically (compare
Dimaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Evans and Bryson 2001; Mouw and Sobel 2001). Yet,
the idea of cultural polarization lingers on in the minds of sociologists and political scien-
tists. While the aforementioned studies have focused on differences between individuals, we
have explored differences between categories of people (i.e., Christians and nonreligious) in
this study to find an increase of polarization (see also Achterberg 2006:113–17; Hoffmann and
Miller 1997). In order to further assess the empirical tenability of the culture wars argument,
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future research could hence explore polarization between groups and subcultures instead of
individuals.
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